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Day's Pyramid Ignores Sturdy
Severability Foundation, Builds Off
Granite Rock
Day v. Fortune Hi-Tech Marketing, Inc.1
I. INTRODUCTION
An exposed pyramid scheme will eventually topple over if it is lacking a fi-
nancial or proper business foundation. Persons involved in a pyramid scheme are
often blind to the overarching pyramid's purpose; similarly, contracting parties
may possess little initial knowledge of an agreement's terms in their entirety.
Arbitration agreements and other contractual obligations can be hidden in the
depths of multiple documents, memorialized through simultaneous agreements
incorporating the additional terms by various references. After Day, courts may
now be required to dig through countless terms to parties' agreements to deter-
mine if a valid contract exists, and if so, which agreement governs the dispute at
issue. After sifting through this contractual jungle, courts will be forced to take
one of two actions: refuse to uphold the entire agreement for a contractual defi-
ciency, rendering the arbitration clause useless, or sever the unenforceable provi-
sions and compel the remaining terms to arbitration.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
Former independent sales representatives' of a marketing company sought to
pursue their class action claims against Defendant Fortune Hi-Tech Marketing,
Inc. (FHTM) for allegedly running an illegal pyramid scheme.3  Plaintiffs4 were
formerly engaged in marketing the services of other companies' to consumers on
behalf of FHTM as independent representatives (IRs or IR).6 As a term of work-
1. Day v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc. 536 F. App'x 600, 601 (6th Cir. 2013).
2. Independent sales representatives were specifically not referred to as employees but instead were
defined as individuals affiliated with FHTM, and were allowed to create and manage their own sales
force, composed of other independent-representatives. In essence, each IR would build its sales force
by recruiting other IRs, and attempt to market the third party marketing sales FHTM offered. This
type of business strategy is also commonly referred to as a "multilevel marketing compensation plan."
Id. at 601.
3. Id.
4. Plaintiffs were originally of two separate class actions that were consolidated into one case, Day
v. Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., No. 10-305-BC, 2012 WL 4049479, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 13, 2012), and
Wallace v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., No. 11-127-BC, 2012 WL 4364086, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Sept.
24, 2012).
5. These various companies and services included: Dish Network, Frontpoint Home Security,
various cell phone providers, and marketers who sold FHTM's line of health and beauty products.
6. Day, 536 F. App'x at 601.
1
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ing as an IR for FHTM, Plaintiffs were obligated to pay an up-front $299 enroll-
ment fee,7 and fill out an "Application and Agreement" acknowledging they had
read the FHTM "Policies and Procedures."
8
The complaint alleged that FHTM had promised substantial amounts of in-
come could be earned as commission for selling FHTM's services. 9 In addition to
charging initial enrollment fees, IRs paid annual fees in order to qualify for com-
missions and bonuses.10 It soon became clear that it was more lucrative for the
IRs to recruit more IRs and collect their enrollment fees than it was to solicit sales
from consumers.11 In its own separate complaint against FHTM, the Federal Trade
Commission determined that the majority of FHTM's IRs actually lost more mon-
ey than they earned.12
The Application and Agreement document purported to incorporate FHTM's
Policies and Procedures by referencing the terms in the Application and Agree-
ment that each IR was required to filled out.13 The IR Application and Agreement
incorporated FHTM's Policies and Procedures and required that any claim
brought under the agreement be submitted to arbitration.14 Section 8.4 of FHTM's
Policies and Procedures provided that the agreement to arbitrate would survive
any termination of the entire agreement and provided that FHTM could modify
the agreement at any time, effective after notice was given.15 Relying on these
provisions, FHTM moved to compel Plaintiffs' class action claims to arbitration.
1 6
The district court initially granted FHTM's motion to compel arbitration, but
later rescinded the order and opinion after Plaintiffs moved the court to reconsider
its decision in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Granite Rock
Co. v. Int'l Broth. Of Teamsters.1
7
In Day, the Sixth Circuit noted that Granite Rock clarified which disputes are
for the court, and which are for the arbitrator.18 In so doing, the Sixth Circuit
found that a court should only compel a dispute to arbitration if the "court is satis-
fied that neither the formation of the parties' arbitration agreement nor its enforce-
ability or applicability to the dispute is at issue." 19 If a party wishes to contest
either issue, the court, not an arbitrator, must resolve the disagreement.20 In the
district court, Plaintiffs argued that FHTM's ability under the contract to unilater-
ally amend any part of the Policies and Procedures at any time constituted an illu-
7. The court did not define what the enrollment fee entailed, but the complaint states FHTM's
Policies and Procedures provides that the $299 fee is for the purchase of an "Optional Special Services
Program." Complaint at 54, Day v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., 536 F. App'x 600 (6th Cir. 2013)
(No. 5:10CV00305).
8. Day, 536, F. App'x at 601.
9. Id. at 602.
10. FTC v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc. No. 13-cv-578, 2013 WL 1858598, at *1 (E.D. Ill. May 1,
2013).
11. Day, 526 F. App'x at 602.
12. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., 2013 WL 1858598, at *1.
13. Day, 536 F. App'x at 601.
14. Id. at 601-02.
15. Id. at 602.
16. Id. at 601.
17. Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Broth. Of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010) (holding that when an
arbitration agreement encompasses the dispute at issue and is validly formed, it is legally enforceable
absent a provision to the contrary).
18. Day, 536 F. App'x at 602.
19. Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 299.
20. Id. at 299-300.
[Vol. 2014
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sory promise.21 The plaintiffs claimed that because the contract was illusory, the
arbitration agreement referenced in the Application and Agreement lacked ade-
quate consideration to form a contract, and was therefore unenforceable.2 The
district court agreed with Plaintiffs and denied FHTM's motion to compel arbitra-
tion. FHTM appealed this decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed on the same basis.
2 4
In Day, the Sixth Circuit decided that the ability of one party to unilaterally
modify any term of the agreement at any time constituted an illusory promise, and
instead of striking the unenforceable provision and upholding the remainder of the
agreement, the court held that the entire agreement including the arbitration clause
25
was unenforceable for lack of consideration.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The analysis in the instant decision is built on three separate foundational
principles. The first is the framework expressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Granite Rock, which determines the proper scope to be used when a court
reviews a dispute after one party attacks the formation element of an arbitration
agreement. 26 The second examines how parties' intent to arbitrate is frustrated by
the doctrine of incorporation by reference. The last discusses the doctrine of sev-
erability and specifically demonstrates how some courts in deciding whether par-
ties have agreed to arbitrate will sever non-arbitrable claims and compel the re-
mainder of the agreement to arbitration.
A. Granite Rock - Formation Element Opens Doors to Courts,
Not Arbitrators
Courts have long interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to require ar-
bitration clauses to be placed "upon the same footing as other contracts., 28 This
statutory directive commands courts to enforce arbitration provisions in most cas-
es. 29 As Granite Rock clarified, the presumption of arbitrability only applies when
a validly formed, legally enforceable, arbitration agreement exists, and no provi-
sion expressly reserves the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator.30
Prior to Granite Rock, lower courts had followed the United States Supreme
Court's precedent,31 compelling arbitration unless a party to a contract challenged
the validity of the arbitration clause itself, not the enforceability of the agreement
21. Day v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., 536 F. App'x 600, 603 (6th Cir. 2013).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 600, 603.
25. Id. at 604.
26. Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 299-300.
27. DeRosa v. Walsh, 541 F. App'x 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2013).
28. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989).
29. Id.
30. Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 288-89.
31. See generally Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
3
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as a whole.32 The courts interpreting the issue had held that dispute of an entire
contract's validity was to be heard by an arbitrator, not the court 3
Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. originally addressed the issue of
whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract was to be heard by a
court or arbitrator.34 The disputed arbitration clause provided "any controversy or
claim arising out of or relating to [the] Agreement" was to be settled by arbitra-
tion.35 Prima Paint sought to escape this arbitration clause by claiming that the
defendant Flood & Conklin (F & C) fraudulently misrepresented its solvency, and
could no longer fulfill its contractual obligation, as F & C had filed for bankrupt-
36
cy. Compelling the parties to arbitration, the Supreme Court held that a federal
court could only decide issues "relating to the making and performance of the
agreement to arbitrate"; therefore, Prima Paint's challenge of fraud in the induce-
ment of the contract as a whole and not to the agreement to arbitrate specifically
was reserved for an arbitrator, not the courts, to decide.37
Continuing to follow Prima Paint, the Supreme Court again addressed the is-
sue of arbitrability in Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, upholding the
"relating to the making and performance" standard, applying it to an arbitration
clause that was allegedly void for illegality.38 In Buckeye, borrowers brought a
class action against a lender in Florida state court, alleging that the lender made
usurious loans violating several state statutes. 39 After the defendant lender sought
to compel the class action to arbitrate, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
arbitration could not be compelled when the contract is allegedly illegal on its
face.40 The court reasoned that compelling arbitration would violate public policy
and contract law.
41
Despite the Florida Supreme Court's determination, the United States Su-
preme Court held "as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration
provision is severable from the remainder of the contract."42 The Court also held
that unless the challenge is aimed at the arbitration clause specifically, and not the
illegality of the agreement as a whole, "the issue of the contract's validity is to be
considered by the arbitrator in the first instance." 43 The plaintiffs allegations
attacked the contract's validity based on the usurious interest rates, and not the
arbitration clause specifically; therefore, the dispute was for an arbitrator to de-
cide.44 Essentially, the Court refused to sever the illegal portions of the contract
which would have rendered the entire agreement unenforceable, and instead de-
termined that the arbitration clause was enforceable apart from the remaining
illegal portion of the contract.
45
32. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006).
33. Id. at 446.
34. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402.
35. Id. at 398.
36. Id.
37. Id at 404.
38. See generally Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
39. Id. at 442.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 445.
43. Id. at 445-46.
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Granite Rock Co. v. Int 'l Broth. Of Teamsters created a new approach when
parties had valid agreements to arbitrate under the Buckeye doctrine. 4 6 In Granite
Rock, an employer sued unions for allegedly violating a no-strike 47 clause in a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA).48 The parties had been in the process of
negotiating an agreement, a component of which was the no-strike clause at is-
sue.4 9 Because the parties had not yet finalized all the terms of the CBA, the issue
was whether preliminary negotiations can give rise to binding arbitration agree-
ments.50
The unions sought to compel arbitration under the agreement, but employer
Granite Rock disputed the formation of the CBA.51 The United States Supreme
Court held that when a dispute over an agreement's ratification is at stake, it is
categorized as a formation dispute: "for purposes of determining arbitrability,
when a contract is formed can be as critical as whether it was formed., 52 The
formation date question required judicial resolution because it required the district
court to resolve the disputed CBA ratification date in determining whether the
parties actually agreed to arbitrate their claims.53 In Granite Rock, the Court held
that when a party contests either the formation of an arbitration agreement, its
enforceability, or its applicability to the dispute, and no valid provision specifical-
ly directs such disputes to an arbitrator, the court must resolve the disagreement
over whether the dispute should go to an arbitrator or not.
54
This rule changed the way courts analyze agreements to arbitrate based on the
principle of prior arbitration decisions that "[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of
consent.55 Under this principle, because employer Granite Rock challenged the
ratification date of the agreement, the formation dispute was to first be heard by a
district court rather than an arbitrator.56
One recent case from the Eleventh Circuit sought to synthesize Granite Rock,
Prima Paint and Buckeye.57  Explaining that Granite Rock's ruling directing
courts to inquire whether a contract was formed essentially "precedes Prima
Paint's bright-line rule, but does not erase it," the Eleventh Circuit articulated a
two-step process. 58 First, a court must resolve any challenge to the formation of
the contract containing the arbitration clause.59 Second, it must determine whether
46. Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Broth. Of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010).
47. A no-strike clause is a provision in a collective bargaining contract in which the union promises
that during the life of the contract the employees will not engage in strikes, slowdowns, or other job
actions. No Strike Definition, U.S. LEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/n/no-strike-clause (last
visited Jan. 3, 2015).




52. Id. at 289 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 289.
54. Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 288.
55. Id. at 299.
56. Id. at 297.
57. Solymar Inv., Ltd. v. Banco Santander S.A., 672 F.3d 981,990 (1 th Cir. 2012).
58. Eleventh Circuit's test: "'1) Resolution of any formation challenged to the contract containing the
arbitration clause, in keeping with Granite Rock; and 2) determination of whether any subsequent
challenges are to the entire agreement, or to the arbitration clause specifically, in keeping with Prima
Paint." SolymarInv., Ltd., 672 F.3d at 990.
59. Solymar Inv., Ltd., 672 F.3d at 990.
5
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"any challenges exist as to the entire agreement, or to the arbitration clause specif-
ically.
60
B. Incorporation by Reference, Multiple Documents Blur Parties'
Intent to Arbitrate
The inquiry into the formation element of parties' agreements to arbitrate may
force courts to analyze a multitude of documents to determine whether a valid
agreement exists between parties. Prior to Granite Rock, one scholar lamented
that, "courts continue to enforce arbitration agreements where the contract at issue
does not contain an arbitration clause," but instead merely refers to a contract
containing an arbitration agreement.
61
A recent Sixth Circuit case addressed the issue of party intent in this context
and noted that arbitrability can quickly become complex when a court is obliged
to examine multiple documents to determine the intent.62 In Dental Associates,
P.C. v. American Dental Partners of Michigan, LLC,63 a group of dentists incor-
porated a business under the name Dental Associates P.C. (Dental).64 Dental
brought various claims against their administrator services provider: breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and other contractual claims.65 Dental executed
several agreements with American Dental Partners of Michigan LLC (ADPM), a
wholly owned subsidiary of American Dental Partners, Inc. (ADPI, collectively,
66ADP).
The agreements consisted of an Asset Purchase Agreement and a Service
Agreement. 6 Under the Asset Purchase Agreement, defendant ADP purchased a
large portion of the assets used in the operations of Dental's profession.68 The
Service Agreement provided administrative services to Dental and required Dental
to enter into Employment Agreements with ADP.69 ADP sought to compel Dental
to arbitrate the claims, but no arbitration clause existed in the parties' Service
Agreement itself70 In support of their motion to compel arbitration, ADP relied
on an integration clause contained in the Asset Purchase Agreement and Service
Agreement that incorporated all the agreements by reference. 1
60. Id.
61. Stuart M. Boyarsky, Deference to A Reference: Incorporating Arbitration Where It Ought Not
Be, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 387,408 (2010).
62. Dental Assocs., P.C. v. Am. Dental Partners of Mich., LLC, 520 F. App'x 349, 351 (6th Cir.
2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 425 (2013).
63. Id. at 350.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 351. Other claims alleged tortious interference with contract, prospective economic ad-
vantage, and unjust enrichment. Id at 349.
66. Id. at 350.




71. Id. (the following agreements were present: (1) Asset Purchase Agreement through which ADPI
obtained a large amount of the assets used in the Associates' dental practice; and (2) a Service Agree-
ment whereby ADPM agreed to provide administrative and other non-clinical assistance to the Associ-
ates; the Associates entered into Employment Agreements with multiple doctors and dentists employed
by the Associates, and although not parties to the Employment Agreement, ADPM and ADPI are
mentioned as third party beneficiaries to the agreement).
[Vol. 2014
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In a case such as Dental Associates where multiple contracts exist between
the parties, the Sixth Circuit determined that a court must first examine whether
the claim can be maintained without reference to the agreement containing the
arbitration clause. 2 If it cannot, then the court must decide which contract pri-
marily governs the claim that is being disputed. 3 Lastly, a dispute is only arbitra-
ble if the arbitration clause in the related contract "is part of the umbrella agree-
ment governing the parties' overall relationship.
7 4
An "umbrella agreement" is an agreement that creates an ongoing relation-
ship between the parties, and thus encompasses a dispute arising out of a contract
later entered into as part of the relationship. 5 Here, the court determined that the
Service Agreement was the parties' "umbrella agreement." Because the Service
Agreement did not itself contain the arbitration clause, but merely purported to
integrate the arbitration clauses by reference, the court found that the parties did
not intend to arbitrate their claims.76
When examining agreements memorialized in multiple documents the Sixth
Circuit articulated that a court must look to the nature of the claim being brought,
and then determine which document really governs the gist of the parties' contrac-
tual relationship. 7 If the document containing the arbitration clause encompasses
the parties' ongoing business relationship, and it also fits within the scope of the
dispute at issue, the claim may be compelled to arbitration. 8
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in State ex rel. U-Haul Co.
of West Virginia v. Zakaib,79 recently considered another example of how the
doctrine of incorporation by reference may distort the way in which parties per-
ceive agreements to arbitrate. 80 The parties in Zakaib executed similar documents
to those at dispute in Day.81 In relation to a transaction with defendant U-Haul,
plaintiffs executed a "Rental Contract" via pre-printed form. 82 The rental contract
that plaintiffs originally signed referenced a Rental Contract Addendum (adden-
dum).83 The Rental Contract stated that the parties agreed to terms found in the
addendum, which contained the arbitration clause. Plaintiffs were only provided a
copy of the addendum after executing the rental contract. 84 Plaintiffs then filed a
class action,85 claiming they were charged fraudulent fees on rental bills in con-
nection with using defendant U-Haul's services. 86 U-Haul asserted that per the
72. Dental Assocs., 520 F. App'x at 352.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc. v. Bollman, 505 F.3d 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2007)).
75. Id. (citing Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP, 281 F. App'x 482, 488 (6th
Cir. 2008).
76. Id. at 353-54.
77. Id at 351-52.
78. DentalAssociates, 520 F. App'x at 352.
79. State ex rel. U-Haul Co. of W. Va. v. Zakaib, 752 S.E.2d 586 (W.Va. 2013)




84. U-Haul, 752 S.E.2d at 591.
85. Id. at 590 (the class action alleged breach of contract, false advertising, fraud, and Consumer
Credit Protection Act violations).
86. Id.
7
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addendum, plaintiffs were still obliged to pay the fees and sought to compel arbi-
tration."
Refuting this argument, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held
that plaintiffs did not violate the doctrine of severability by challenging the arbi-
tration clause contained in the addendum to the rental contracts.88 The doctrine of
severability allows a court to consider a challenge to an arbitration clause "only if
a party ... explicitly challenges the enforceability of an arbitration clause within
the contract, as opposed to generally challenging the contract as a whole."
89
Plaintiffs specifically challenged the enforceability of the addendum by showing
that the arbitration clause was never provided to them as a part of the transac-
tion. 90 The addendum was merely referenced in the rental agreement and the
court found that the plaintiffs thus lacked "the requisite knowledge of the contents
of the Addendum to establish ... consent to be bound by its terms.
' 91
A similar dispute over an incorporated arbitration agreement arose in a recent
Missouri state court case, where an admissions director alleged that she was
wrongfully terminated by a secondary education institution in violation of the
Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). 92 In Johnson v. Vatterott Educ. Centers,
Inc., plaintiff executed an arbitration agreement, titled "At Will Employment and
Binding Arbitration Agreement" (arbitration agreement), which was found in the
employer's handbook. 93 Although the separate arbitration agreement delegated a
wide variety of employment-related disputes to arbitration, the court found the
arbitration agreement "plainly constituted part of the employee handbook."94
The arbitration agreement was executed separately, but stated that it was sub-
ject to the general provisions found in the employee handbook.95 The court found
that the employee handbook merely articulated guidelines "which were unilateral-
ly modifiable at any time by [employer] Vatterott," and that no one other than the
employer's president had binding authority to contract on behalf of the employer
with employees.96 Considering these factors, the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District held that because the separately executed arbitration agree-
ment constituted part of the "mere guidelines" of the defendant employer's hand-
book, the arbitration agreement was "not a contractual offer which became bind-
ing on [plaintiff] Johnson's acceptance of it." 97
The Sixth Circuit has also addressed arbitration clauses that are illusory for
lack of consideration. In Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc.98 the court
found the arbitration agreement to be illusory based on an arbitration clause pro-
vided in the employment application documents. 99 The arbitration clause in Floss
87. Id. at 591-93.
88. Id. at 598.
89. U-Haul, 752 S.E.2d at 598, n.15.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Johnson v. Vatterott Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 410 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 739 (weighing factors such as the location of the Arbitration Agreement in the employee
handbook, identical headings used in the handbook and the arbitration agreement, and inconsistencies
in relation to the guidelines in the employee handbook).
95. Id. at 741.
96. Id.
97. Vatterott, 410 S.W.3d at 742.
98. 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
99. Id. at 310.
[Vol. 2014
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failed to provide a definite forum for arbitration, and directed all claims to be
heard by a third party employment dispute company.'l ° Defendant employer was
listed as a third party beneficiary to the employment application and since no def-
inite forum to arbitrate was provided, the court held, "the fact those [terms] could
be unilaterally modified at any time rendered such promises illusory."10 1 Further,
the court reasoned that "where a promisor retains an unlimited right to decide later
the nature or extent of his performance, the promise is too indefinite for legal
enforcement."' ' Because the employer possessed the unfettered discretion in
choosing the nature of the arbitration forum, and retained the right to alter the
terms without any obligation to notify plaintiffs, the promise was illusory.
10 3
C. Severability: What's Enforceable and What's Not?
If a written agreement contains terms, which a court ultimately deems uncon-
scionable, a court may strike those terms from the agreement and enforce the
rest. 1°4 Contracts for the sale of goods containing terms that materially alter or
surprise the other party might allow a court to refrain from incorporating those
terms into the agreement.
10 5
Under the United States Supreme Court's direction on analyzing arbitration
agreements, when a party challenges a provision apart from the arbitration clause,
or the contract as a whole, a court is still not prevented from enforcing a specific
agreement to arbitrate. 
106
Although the Sixth Circuit has not strictly adhered to this Supreme Court doc-
trine, 107 a recent Fourth Circuit case did follow the principle. 10 8 In DeRosa v.
Walsh, an assignee of patent rights sought to argue that a claim for patent in-
fringement should be severed from an arbitration agreement and allowed to pro-
ceed in court.10 9 The court ultimately compelled all claims to arbitration, but not-
ed that if a court anticipates some of the claims in litigation not to be arbitrable,
"the court must sever and compel arbitration of all arbitrable claims and reserve
jurisdiction for any non-arbitrable claims."'1 0 If a court finds some claims arising
out of an agreement containing an arbitration provision do not fall within the
scope of the arbitration clause, it may enforce the remainder of the agreement and
adjudicate the non-arbitrable claims.111
In essence, the formation element of an arbitration agreement remains a tough
analysis, turning first on whether intent to arbitrate is found in the actual arbitra-
tion agreement, or if it is found somewhere else, in other agreements that charac-
100. Id.
101. Day v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., 536 F. App'x 600, 604 (6th Cir. 2013).
102. Floss, 211 F.3dat 316.
103. Id.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208, cmt. c (1981); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
105. U.C.C. § 2-207, cmt. 5 (2012).
106. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
107. See B&R Assocs. v. Dependable Care Ins. Co., Inc., 835 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 1987); KPMG
LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 24 (2011); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217
(1985).
108. See DeRosa v. Walsh, 541 F. App'x 250 (4th Citr. 2013).
109. Id. at 252.
110. Id. at 253.
111. Id.
9
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terize the nature of the parties' relationship. In order to find this intent, courts
may have to analyze many documents. Additionally, the arbitration agreement
may be voided if one side has too much power to alter the agreement, and this
"power to alter" may be buried in other documents, not just the arbitration agree-
ment.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
After the district court rescinded its decision to compel plaintiffs to arbitration
and ordered the claims to proceed to trial, FHTM appealed, asserting that despite
the district court finding the agreement lacked consideration, FHTM was still
entitled to compel arbitration.112 Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration clause refer-
enced in the "FHTM Policies and Procedures" lacked consideration because it
gave FHTM the sole discretion to modify the terms of the contract at any time.113
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first noted that review of the lower court's deci-
sion would be de novo, and that Kentucky contract formation law would apply in
determining the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.114 Although the court
referenced the policy favoring arbitration, it also cited Granite Rock and found
that "if the dispute is itself over the validity of the arbitration clause," the pre-
sumption favoring arbitration no longer applies.1 15 Granite Rock guided the court
to compel arbitration only after determining the parties' arbitration agreement was
validly formed, covered the dispute in question, and was legally enforceable.
1 16
Plaintiffs challenged the agreement containing the arbitration clause because
of a lack of valid consideration.117 Under Kentucky law, the contract had mutuali-
ty and adequate consideration, and arbitration clauses by themselves do not re-
quire independent consideration separate from consideration in general.118 As
long as the contract as a whole is supported by consideration, each clause is con-
sidered to be valid unless there is some other defect in validity.
1 19
Considering the terms of FHTM's Policies and Procedures, the court held that
because the agreement gave FHTM the unilateral right to modify any terms of the
contract at any time, its promises were illusory.120 The court found that the
agreement did not in fact bind FHTM because FHTM could have changed the
terms and left Plaintiffs with no available contract law remedy.121 Without ade-
quate consideration, "the entire contract, including the arbitration clause, [was]
void and unenforceable. 122
The Sixth Circuit analogized the arbitration agreement at issue with its prior
holding in Floss.123 FHTM attempted to refute the claim for lack of consideration,
asserting that despite the power to modify any term of the agreement, no such
112. Day v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., 536 F. App'x 600, 604 (6th Cir. 2013).





118. Day v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., 536 F. App'x 600, 603 (6th Cir. 2013).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 604.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000).
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action had been taken; therefore the contract still had valid consideration, and was
not illusory.12 4 The court found that regardless of the fact that FHTM maintained
the original terms of the agreement, "[n]othing bound defendant to continue its
agreement, or even to maintain the same terms. 125 Further, the court determined
that under Kentucky contract law, "[w]ithout a binding obligation, a promise is
illusory, and therefore not enforceable as a contract., 126 FHTM also attempted to
argue that since the parties performed under the contract, the court could infer an
enforceable agreement existed during that time period, but the court rejected this
reasoning: "subsequent performance cannot excuse a want of consideration."
' 12
Further, FHTM asked the court to enforce the arbitration agreement because
it contained survival language, 128 and thus, bound Plaintiffs once they terminated
their contracts. 129 Not persuaded by this argument, the Sixth circuit explained, "a
sub-clause that was never valid and binding cannot survive the termination of the
agreement, because it was never binding in the first place. 130
Finally, FHTM pleaded to sever the provision allowing FHTM to amend any
part of the agreement at its sole discretion, and enforce the remainder the con-
tract. 131 Throwing out this argument, the Sixth Circuit claimed no such authority
existed, nor any express language would allow them to revise the contract and
"cure it of this deficiency."1 3 2 The Sixth Circuit held that the Defendant's ability
to unilaterally modify any term of the contract at any time was illusory, and thus,
the entire agreement, including the arbitration clause, was unenforceable due to
lack of adequate consideration. 
133
V. COMMENT
The first part of this discussion touches on the judicial and societal implica-
tions that came with the holding in Granite Rock. The next portion will delve into
how this new additional part of arbitration foundation will complicate courts'
contractual interpretations when determining the enforceability of arbitration
clauses buried in multiple documents. The concluding discussion turns to how the
Sixth Circuit neglected to follow the important contractual doctrine of severabil-
ity.
Day suggests that the Sixth Circuit took Granite Rock as grounds to render
entire agreements unenforceable when a single provision is found invalid, despite
limitations on a court's ability to sever an arbitration provision from the remainder
of the contract. 134 Day ultimately gives broad discretion to look at various state
124. Day v. Fortune Hi-Tech Mktg., Inc., 536 F. App'x 600, 604 (6th Cir. 2013).
125. Id. at 605.
126. Id. (citing Morgan v. Morgan, 218 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Ky. 1949); Rehm-Zeiher v. F.G. Walker
Co., 160 S.W. 777 (Ky. 1913)).
127. Id. (citing Rehm-Zeiher, 160 S.W. at 780).
128. Survival language may be defined as language that clearly indicates an intention to bind the
parties to the arbitration regardless of the longevity of any separate agreements. See, e.g., Gonzalez v.
W. Suburban Imports, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 970, 972-73 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
129. Day, 536 F. App'x at 604.
130. Id. at 605.
131. Id. at 606.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 604.
134. Day, 536 F. App'x at 604; see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440,
445 (2006).
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law principles of contract formation, and use specific contractual challenges to
throw out entire agreements between parties based on just a few unenforceable
terms. Contracting parties now may be forced to cross their fingers instead of
their "T's" in the hope that entire arbitration agreements will not be invalidated
for unforeseeable errors.
In Day, the Sixth Circuit rendered a proper decision as it pertained to the new
Granite Rock framework because it corrected what many decisions since Buckeye
had misplaced. In these misplaced decisions, intent to arbitrate was inferred when
parties contested whether a valid agreement had been formed in the first place.
The Granite Rock decision directed courts to ask this question before reviewing
the nature of a plaintiffs claim, disputing either the entire agreement, or specifi-
cally, the arbitration clause.
Armed with this precedent, courts may now review whether a contract has ac-
tually been formed, as opposed to widely compelling arbitration, which can lead
to "instances where parties have been compelled to arbitrate disputes despite nev-
er having entered an arbitration agreement." '135 This is precisely what happened in
Day on reconsideration: plaintiffs who were duped by a prolific pyramid scheme
were allowed to proceed with their claims in court because they challenged an
arbitration clause integrated by reference as lacking consideration to the entire
agreement. The court looked at the consideration for the contract as a whole, and
did not focus on whether there was specific consideration for the arbitration
agreement itself.
Employers or other parties with significant bargaining power to these types of
agreements may take issue with the holding in Granite Rock as it likely opens the
door to more claims making their way into the courts. Issues of existence and
validity will arise and courts no longer must look only at the specific arbitration
clause; instead, they can look at the agreement as a whole, including other incor-
porated agreements. 136
Though this is arguably a positive trend for plaintiffs wishing to take their
claims to court, courts may now be required to sift and analyze a plethora of doc-
uments to determine whether: (1) a valid agreement had been formed, (2) whether
the agreement at issue applies to the dispute, and (3) whether or not a valid provi-
sion specifically delegating the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator exists.
13
Despite the economic judicial costs of delving into this forest of contractual
documents, such a method may be the most reasonable one a court can use to find
the original intent of the parties. One example of how this might actually be the
best result can be found in Zakaib, where the court cautioned: "with the rise of
internet commerce and electronic recordkeeping over the last two decades, courts
have grappled with electronic forms of transaction." 138 Courts first struggled with
these "shrinkwrap" agreements, but then also found that they had to be analyzed
in order to find the intent of the parties.139 As relationships between parties be-
come more complex, so too will the many agreements between them. Though
135. Boyarsky, supra note 61, at 391.
136. Bruce G. Paulsen & Jeffrey M. Dine, Enforcement of International Arbitration Agreements in
the United States After Granite Rock and Rent-A-Center, 16 IBA ARB. NEWS 144, 147 (2011).
137. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Broth. Of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 303 (2010); Buckeye Check
Cashing, 546 U.S. at 449; Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68-69 (2010).
138. State ex rel. U-Haul Co. ofW. Va. v. Zakaib, 752 S.E.2d 586, 593-94 (W.Va. 2013).
139. Id. at 594.
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courts may have to tear through pages and pages of a transaction's terms, piecing
together a contractual puzzle may prove to be the more just result in deducing the
parties true intent of their agreement.
The same is true in the employment context or with modem business transac-
tions. The old fashioned economic costs of providing hard copies for each party
to an agreement has been replaced by simple "click and accept" execution. As
one commentator explains, "[s]ignificant business relationships are often memori-
alized in multiple documents-sometimes in the form of multiple simultaneous
documents, on other occasions with an intentional sequencing of the docu-
ments." 140 On the other hand, "there can be good reasons for using multiple writ-
ings." 141 However, "a number of principles of contract construction and enforce-
ment are not well adapted to this style of contracting."
14 2
The Sixth Circuit in Day refused to sever the unenforceable arbitration
agreement, instead invalidating the entire contract. Ultimately this rationale failed
to consider contractual and arbitration precedent, but the court also stated "we
cannot find any authority ... that would permit us to revise the contract to cure
this deficiency" of the clause it found to invalidate the entire agreement for lack of
consideration. Buckeye, along with the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§
211, 208 and UCC provision 2-207, grant courts discretion to sever terms they
find to be unenforceable, unconscionable, or constitute a surprise that materially
alters the contract. 143 Further, as Buckeye and Rent-A-Center articulate, a court
may choose to sever an arbitration provision from the remainder of the contract.
144
The Sixth Circuit may well have had a valid reason for refusing to sever the
unilateral modification provision incorporated by reference in FHTM's policies
and procedures, but ultimately failed to articulate any reason for doing so other
than the fact that FHTM did not expressly have a severability clause in its terms.
It seems likely that even if FHTM had such a provision, the court would have
found that provision to be unenforceable as well for lack of consideration. In
reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit examined all the materials that were
incorporated by reference, which included many documents that governed the
complex relationship between the parties. This sets a precedent, which requires
courts to spend precious judicial resources sifting through such documents, and
also instructs courts that they need not sever unenforceable provisions from the
contract as a whole and compel arbitration.
This precedent not only increases economic burdens for courts, but also does
so for parties attempting to draft agreements that courts will enforce. The transac-
tion costs of attempting to streamline all of the parties' agreements into one doc-
ument will be overwhelming for both the drafter and executor. In addition, many
transactions that continue to memorialize agreements with a multitude of docu-
ments-whether for economic or efficiency reasons-will face a contractual leap
140. Royce de R. Barondes, Side Letters, Incorporation by Reference and Construction of Contractu-
al Relationships Memorialized in Multiple Writings, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 651, 653 (2012).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 208, cmt. c, 211(3) (1981); U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 5
(2012).
144. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v.
Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 69 (2010).
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of faith as to how to structure their terms to ensure they will be later upheld by a
court reviewing arbitrability.
VI. CONCLUSION
With this new foundation for addressing arbitration agreements under
Granite Rock, if parties truly wish to commit to arbitration, businesses and em-
ployers alike must be careful to conform individual agreements to adhere to state
law principles of contract formation, else run the risk of having their claims settled
in court rather than by arbitration. Under Day, in order to deduce parties' intent,
courts will have to look to all of the agreements in place between parties, which
characterizes the overall nature of the relationship. This will create substantial
economic burden on parties seeking to reduce transaction costs, but may in fact
create a just alternative in assisting the usual victims of contracts of adhesion.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit's failure to discuss any type of severability doctrine
leaves contracting parties in the dark as to how a party can form a valid agreement
to arbitrate, which would require parties to check and recheck all of the agree-
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